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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the foundational principles of the attorney-client relationship
is that the client, rather than the lawyer, determines the objectives of the
representation. 2 Accordingly, corporate counsel should not invade the prov-
ince of the client by taking over the client's decision-making, even when -
as is often the case in corporate representations - the business decision will
have significant legal consequences.3 The fact that the lawyer does not make
the business decisions for the corporate client does not mean the lawyer's
role is unimportant, however. On the contrary, the role of legal advisor is of
crucial importance to the welfare of the corporate client and others who de-
pend on the viability of that corporation.4 Counsel's role is to advise the
corporate representatives who make the corporation's business decisions
about the law, the legality of different courses of action, and the possible
consequences of choices available. Such advice may appropriately include
social, moral, and political dimensions in addition to legal information.5 By
fully advising clients, corporate lawyers help keep the enterprise moving.
They "keep the wheels on the wagon," warning the client of dangers on the
road ahead. To develop the metaphor, corporate counsel helps managers and
executives steer the enterprise away from legal hazards and avert the poten-
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULES] R. 1.2 (2002).
3. Id. MODEL RULE 1.2(a) also suggests that the lawyer's role includes determining the
means by which client objectives should be pursued. Id. In the same sentence indicating that
the client is entitled to set the objectives of the representation, the rule states that the lawyer
must consult with the client regarding the "means" of achieving objectives. Id. "[A]s re-
quired by Rule 1.4, [the lawyer] shall consult with the client as to the means by which they
[the objectives] are to be pursued." Id. Comment 1 to the rule echoes this obligation of the
lawyer to consult with the client. MODEL RULE 1.2 cmt. 1. Comment 2 notes the anticipated
division of decision-making between lawyer and client:
Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer
with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, par-
ticularly with respect to technical, legal, and tactical matters. Conversely,
lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense
to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely af-
fected.
MODEL RULE 1.2 cmt. 2. MODEL RULE 1.4 reiterates this approach and other rules and com-
ments build on this theme. See, e.g., MODEL RULE 1.4 cmt. 5.
4. The cumulative effects of corporate vitality and honesty impact the economy gener-
ally and millions of employees and shareholders individually. Protecting against such harm
serves the public interest. A more philosophical and broader metaphor of lawyers as indi-
viduals who prevent harm is presented by Justice Stewart G. Pollock. See Stewart G. Pollock,
Lawyers and Judges as Catchers in the Rye, 34 TULSA L. J. 1 (1998).
5. See MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 9; MODEL RULE 2.1 cmt. 2.
Vol. 3
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tial disaster from failing to comply with the law. For the benefit of all con-
cerned, the lawyer must fully advise clients on the law and the importance of
compliance with the law. Lawyers should believe that compliance with the
law is a worthy goal and that compliance benefits the client as well as soci-
ety. The long-term health and productivity of a corporation depends not
only on developing and implementing a profitable business strategy, but also
on complying with the law. Thus, despite the fact that corporate counsel
should not make business decisions, he has a central role in maintaining the
financial health of the corporate client.
In recent months, the wheels have come off several major U.S. cor-
porations, causing losses for shareholders, employees, and others. The
catastrophic effects of deceptive corporate practices, including misleading
off-balance sheet bookkeeping and fraudulent loans, illustrate the dangers of
self-dealing on the long-term viability of corporations and the economic
health of the nation.6 Inflated corporate earnings reports of WorldCom, En-
ron, and other corporations spurred investigations and prosecution for crimi-
nal fraud, resulting in further scandals and losses. Falling share values and
employment levels, restatements of corporate earnings, downgrading of
credit ratings, bankruptcy litigation, and other negative consequences have
followed, exacerbating a downward trend in the economy at large.
7
The significance of corporate vitality to the economy of the country
and to the well-being of investors and employees can hardly be overstated.
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commis-
sion) have sought to enhance corporate accountability in an effort to restore
investor confidence and reinvigorate the U.S. economy.
Recent events underscore what we already knew - confi-
dence in our capital markets cannot be maintained if the
public believes that corporate leaders, their advisors or their
cohorts, are "gaming" the system and focusing principally,
if not exclusively, on their own personal gain. We must re-
assure investors after the string of recent scandals that such
abuses of the system are not, and will not be allowed to be-
come, the norm in American business.8
6. For a full discussion of the accounting practice of keeping two sets of books on the
finances and income of a corporation, see Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs
and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 35 (2003).
7. The causes of the current corporate problems are the subject of intense speculation.
See, e.g., John Cassidy, The World of Business: The Greed Cycle, THE NEW YORKER, Sept.
23, 2002, at 64.
8. Speech by SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt: Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association's Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2003).
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The role of corporate lawyers as well as that of corporate executives
and accountants has been called into question by recent market disasters.9
"The actions of some attorneys have drawn increasing scrutiny and criticism
in light of recent events demonstrating that at least 'some lawyers have for-
gotten their responsibility.""'  Both the law and lawyers play vital roles in
the economic life of society. Clear legal advice and accurate projections of
the consequences of the options available to the corporation enhance the
viability and profitability of the corporate client.
This Article explores the obligations of the lawyer to the corporate
client and to society. It examines both established principles and recent de-
velopments relevant to the lawyer's role. Part II of the Article discusses
some of the rules of legal ethics that provide both guidance and restraints on
corporate counsel. It focuses on the lawyer's duty to provide the client with
independent professional judgment and to keep the client informed about the
representation. It also explores the lawyer's duty to maintain the confidenti-
ality of client information and duties specific to representing an organiza-
tional client. Part III explains recent developments that may affect the role
of corporate counsel, including the first comprehensive revision of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in since 1983" and the SEC's promul-
gation of Rule 205 pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.12 Part IV
assesses the obligations of lawyers in light of the cumulative effect of the
two systems: laws and ethics rules. It concludes that a system of justice
based on the principle of rule of law must take account of public policy ar-
ticulated by legislative and judicial authority and must make judgments
based on conduct rather than the status of parties involved in legal issues.
9. See, e.g., Mike France, What about the Lawyers?, Bus. Wk., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58; see
also Richard A. Oppel Jr., Lawyer Warned Enron Officials of Dubious Deals, available at
N.Y.Times.com/2002/02/ 07/business/ (noting that lawyer Jordan Mintz proposed several
ways to correct problems at Enron nearly a year before the company collapsed); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57
Bus. LAW. 1421 (2002) (noting the distinction between the role of lawyers and auditors).
10. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm (quoting remarks by Senator John Edwards,
148 Cong. Rec., at S6551 (July 10, 2002)); see also S.E.C. Proposed Rule: Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 CFR Parts 205, 240, 249, [Release Nos.
33-8186; 34-47282; IC-25920; File No. S7-45-02] RIN 3235-AI72.
11. Environmental practice provides the context for some discussion in this Part, as an
area where the competing interests of society and the client can be dramatic.
12. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 ordered the SEC to promulgate regulations to require
that lawyers representing corporations subject to the Act report evidence of material viola-
tions of securities regulations to authorities within the corporation. In response to the Act, the
SEC has promulgated proposed and final rules on the reporting inside and outside the corpo-
rate entity.
Vol. 3
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II. THE RULES OF ETHICS FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL
The rules of legal ethics apply to all lawyers, without regard to
whether the lawyer represents individual or organizational clients or whether
the lawyer is "outside" (retained) counsel or an employee of the client
("house" counsel). The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct explicitly acknowledges the point: "Every lawyer is responsible for
observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct."
3 Likewise, the Prelimi-
nary Statement to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility notes that
"[d]isciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless
of the nature of their professional activities."' 4 Although the same rules ap-
ply to all lawyers practicing within a jurisdiction, context is significant in the
application of the rules of legal ethics.'5 Different types of legal representa-
tion present different challenges.'6 For example, the in-house lawyer is in-
evitably more economically dependent on his single client than a lawyer
representing numerous clients.' 7 Indeed, the insider counsel is in essence
"wedded" to the corporate client.'8 The reality of the employed corporate
counsel's greater dependence on his employer-client should not be ignored in
13. MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 12.
14. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement reprinted in
REGULATION OF LAWYERS STATUTES AND STANDARDS 534 (Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon
eds. 2002).
15. See Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses of Proto-
cols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (2002) (noting some of the problems
associated with protocols of lawyer conduct); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count:
Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993) (noting distinctions
between "lawyers as counselors" and "lawyers as litigators").
16. Some scholars have criticized the Model Rules for failing to acknowledge the particu-
lar concerns of lawyers practicing in specific settings with specific problems such as envi-
ronmental law or corporate practice. See, e.g. J. William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal
Ethics, and Codes of Professional Responsibility, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 825 (1994); Douglas
R. Williams, Loyalty, Independence and Social Responsibility in the Practice of Environ-
mental Law, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1061 (2000).
17. For example:
More than with outside counsel, corporate in-house counsel may be faced
with a moral dilemma between ethical norms and the client's interest,
since in-house counsel is dependent on one employer to provide his or her
livelihood and career success. Therefore, an in-house attorney faced with
a choice between the demands of an employer and the requirements of an
ethical code has an even greater claim to judicial protection than a nonat-
torney employee.
General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 1164-65 (Cal. 1994). In difficult
economic times, the dependent nature of the house counsel on his employer is even greater.
See, e.g., Matt Kelly, The Attorney, Unemployed: The lawyer jobless rate has doubled since
the boom, THE NAT'L L.J., APRIL 10, 2003, available at http://www.law.com/servlet/Con-
tenServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Preview&c=LawArticle&cid=104
8 58 2510 66
(last visited Apr. 28, 2003).
18. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the 1990s: A View from Outside,
49 SMU L. REV. 483, 484 (1996).
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application of the rules relating to such representations. 9 Likewise, the law-
yer should recognize the inherent tendency to identify with his corporate
client and guard against loss of independence.2"
While corporate counsel's primary role is to advise the client of the
law, fulfilling this role involves in-depth knowledge of the client's business
and application of the law to business practices. Like other lawyers, those
who represent a corporation must balance duties to the client, the justice
system, and others. On one hand, the lawyer owes the client confidentiality,
loyalty, and diligence. On the other hand, the lawyer has duties to society
and non-clients, such as the duty to avoid assisting a client (or anyone) in a
crime or fraud and the lawyer's duty of candor to the court and others. That
the task of balancing these interests is inherent in lawyering is apparent from
the statement of principles of legal ethics.
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason.
They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of
legal representation and of the law itself.... The Rules pre-
suppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role.
That context includes court rules and statutes relating to
matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of
lawyers, and substantive and procedural law in general....
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open soci-
ety, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary
compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and
public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforce-
ment through disciplinary proceedings.2
Corporate Counsel s Role
(1) The Duty to Provide Candid Advice
Lawyers are routinely called upon to exercise moral judgment in ad-
vising clients. In the corporate setting, lawyers often become trusted advi-
19. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.7.5, at 741 (1986). The com-
mentary and discussion in SEC Proposed Rule 205 recognize the distinction between retained
and in-house counsel in the noisy withdrawal proposal. See Comment of Richard W. Painter,
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, December 18,
2002, on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
[Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868; IC-25829; File No. S7-45-02] (speaking favorably of the
Commission's different rule for inside counsel and retained for disaffirming own work prod-
uct, which has been used to perpetrate a fraud) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules
/proposed/s74502/rwpainterl.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2003).
20. In discussing this point in relation to the case of Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104
(Ill. 1991), one lawyer noted that corporate counsel should always keep "your resume up-to-
date and your bags packed." Panelist on ABA Panel on Ethics in Environmental Practice,
New Orleans ABA Environmental Section Fall Meeting, September 23, 2000.
21. MODEL RULES, scope, para. 14-16.
Vol. 3
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sors not only for their legal knowledge, but also for the practical wisdom
they offer. The Preamble to the Model Rules acknowledges that the law,
their personal conscience, and the approbation of peers, in addition to the
rules of ethics, should guide lawyers.22 Lawyers serve their clients not only
by providing technical legal expertise, but also by helping advance good
corporate decision-making and urging compliance with the law. Because the
lawyer's role is to explain the law and its impact on the corporation in par-
ticular transactions, the attitude that the lawyer projects to the corporate cli-
ent about compliance inevitably influences the way the organization regards
compliance. If the lawyer gives his explanation with a "wink and a nod" or
with the attitude of "everyone does it" the corporation will take its cue from
the lawyer's attitude as much as from his statement of the law. Clearly,
compliance with the law is in the enlightened self-interest of the client.
23
The lawyer with serious regard for the law will influence client decisions in
a positive way, communicating that compliance with the law has a long-term
benefit for the corporation.
The Scope section of the Model Rules notes that the Rules do not
"exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer..
. ."24 The Model Rules note that "many difficult issues of professional dis-
cretion" arise in practice, the Scope section to the Model Rules states that
ethics issues "must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying 
the Rules. 25
In discussing the lawyer's role as advisor, Model Rule 2.1 acknowledges that
the role of lawyers to advise clients properly extends beyond providing a
summary or explanation of the law to clients. Of great significance is the
mandatory nature of the lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional
judgment: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a law-
yer may refer not only to law but to other considerations, such as moral,
economic, social, and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation."26
The obligation of lawyers to both society and individual clients is
axiomatic. Indeed, the role of lawyers to serve individual clients is justified
by the over-arching benefits to society and the system of justice. The Pre-
22. See MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 6.
23. Comments of Richard W. Painter, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, Ann Arbor, December 18, 2002, on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys [Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868; IC-25829;
File No. S7-45-02 available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7450
2/rwpainterl.htm
(last visited Apr. 27, 2003) (noting that Section 307 "will allow honest lawyers and clients to
thrive in a legal and economic system that values disclosure - including disclosure by lawyers
to their own clients - over deceit.").
24. See MODEL RULES, scope, para. 16.
25. See MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 9.
26. MODEL RULE 2.1 (emphasis added).
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amble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct makes the point more
than once. It states, for example, that "[t]he profession has a responsibility
to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest."27 Addi-
tionally, the Preamble states the importance of the lawyer's role in society is"vital" to the "preservation of society."2 It concludes that "[t]he fulfillment
of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our
legal system."29
Corporate counsel should advise the client of the legal, economic,
political, and moral consequences of its future potential actions. This is no
small task. It is particularly challenging when the legal issues involved or
scientific data are unclear or when the lawyer's advice runs counter to the
desires of the client. Recognition that lawyers as legal advisors may some-
times refer to moral, economic, social, and other factors suggests that law-
yers are not merely legal technocrats or "hired guns," despite the fact that
they seek to further the client's objectives when the objectives are legal.
Comment 2 to Model Rule 2.1 indicates that the scope of the lawyer's role is
not limited to purely legal or technical considerations:
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value
to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as
cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely
technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inade-
quate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and
ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer
is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considera-
tions impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively
influence how the law will be applied.3"
This comment underscores the point that the role of the lawyer is
broad and cannot be properly achieved by abdicating professional judgment
to the client or tailoring advice to suit the client's desires. Lawyers some-
times complain that clients are not interested in the lawyer's evaluation of
their objectives but merely in the lawyer's ability to further those objectives.
This attitude of some clients can be summed up as: "Don't tell me whether
to pursue this objective. Just tell me how to achieve it."'" A lawyer who
capitulates to the client's desires, blindly serving the client's wishes without
judging the legality of those wishes, may be a short-term hero, but he vio-
27. MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 12.
28. MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 13.
29. MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 13.
30. MODEL RULE 2.1 cmt. 2.
3 1. This statement does not necessarily mean that the client intends to pursue his plans
without regard to their legality or illegality. The statement may simply mean that the lawyer
needs to educate the client on the limits of his legal right to pursue an objective in the manner
he wishes.
Vol. 3
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lates his professional duty to the client. Setting aside his independent judg-
ment constitutes a breach of the lawyer's professional responsibility.
32
Moreover, such a breach makes the lawyer vulnerable to the risk that his
hero status will vanish when a judicial or agency decision disagrees or inves-
tigates his reasoning. Exploiting opportunistic advantage involves embrac-
ing long-term risks. The lawyer who shrinks from the obligation of provid-
ing candid and independent judgment, or "spins" the law in favor of the cli-
ent's desires, risks unfavorable results in the long run. Whether the lawyer
drafts a contract that overreaches the other party or interprets a regulation to
allow the client to disregard or water down a reporting obligation, the risk of
unfavorable outcomes is a real one for both the client and the lawyer. In
other words, enlightened self-interest as well as professionalism suggest that
the lawyer should urge both compliance with law and fair dealings generally.
The "hired gun" approach may seem profitable in the short run - until a
court refuses enforcement of a contract term based on the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing33 or regulators launch an enforcement action against
the client.34 In some cases, the regulators pursue the lawyer as well as the
client, with significant personal and professional consequences for each.
"Even a lawsuit that never results in a judgment can have a potentially ruin-
ous effect on a lawyer's reputation and 
career., 35
Model Rule 2.1 demands that lawyers exercise independent judg-
ment. It establishes the propriety of communicating "relevant moral and
ethical considerations" in advising clients.
3
' Taken seriously, this profes-
sional rule is not simply a matter of the preferences or inclinations of the
lawyer. It is not merely the lawyer's right of personal expression. Rather, it
is the lawyer's obligation. He is charged by the rules of ethics and his
unique role in the social order to deliver an objective view of legal require-
ments - even if it undercuts the client's plans. Exercising independent pro-
fessional judgment is mandatory.
37 The lawyer owes the client a candid
evaluation of the propriety and risks of a course of action. Moral and politi-
cal reasoning provide the tools for fulfilling this mandatory role. "Although
32. See MODEL RULE 2.1 (stating that the lawyer "shall" exercise independent profes-
sional judgment).
33. See UCC 1-203, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE CONTRACT LAW § 205; see also Bak-
A-Lum Corp. of America v. Alcoa Bldg. Prod., 351 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1976) (holding obligation
of good faith and fair dealing required manufacturer to give plaintiff-distributor adequate
notice of termination of exclusive distributorship to allow plaintiff to recover profits); Zilg v.
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671 (2nd Cir. 1983) (holding publisher had implied duty 
of
obligation of good faith in promoting book it published).
34. See generally W. Frank Newton, A Lawyer's Duty to the Legal System and to a Cli-
ent: Drawing the Line, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 701 (1994).
35. Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU. L. REV. 225, 227 (1996) (describing the threat of
civil liability for securities lawyers in particular).
36. MODEL RULE 2.1 cmt. 2.
37. The rule states that the lawyer "shall exercise independent professional judgment."
MODEL RULE 2.1 (emphasis added).
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a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations
impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the
law will be applied."38 For this reason, the lawyer who bites his tongue
rather than voice the unpleasant argument against a client's course of action
fails more than his own conscience; he fails to fulfill the foundational duty
of providing candid legal advice.
(2) The Client's Obiectives
The Model Rules take as the baseline of the relationship between
lawyers and clients that clients have a right to decide the goals of a represen-
tation. Thus, the rules require lawyers to "abide by a client's decisions con-
cerning the objectives of representation,"" to keep the client informed of the
matters of the representation, and to consult with the client regarding the
means of achieving the client's objectives.40 Model Rule 1.2 states that "a
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued."'', This rule sets a significant start-
ing place for analysis of the relative roles and powers of lawyers and clients.
The rule respects the client's "ultimate authority to determine the purposes to
be served by legal representation." '42 It also recognizes "the limits imposed
by law and the lawyer's professional obligations."43
When a lawyer disagrees with the client about the way to proceed in
a matter, the rules impose a duty on the lawyer to consult with the client and
seek a resolution of the disagreement. Only after such a consultation should
a lawyer take the step of withdrawing from a representation over a dis-
agreement with a client. "The lawyer should also consult with the client and
seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts
are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the cli-
ent, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation."" This point focuses
on the attorney-client relationship in media res, after a problem has arisen.
In the corporate setting, the goal setting and the evaluation of goals
in light of the legal consequences often do (and should) be integral parts of
one cohesive process. Thus, corporate counsel should be an integral part of
the business decision-making, assisting the client in clarifying and prioritiz-
ing goals in light of the law. The corporate setting can present complicating
38. MODEL RULE 2.1 cmt. 2.
39. MODEL RULE 1.2(a). See also Lord v. Money Masters, Inc., 435 S.E.2d 247 (Ga.
App. 1993).
40. MODEL RULE 1.2(a), 1.4; see also Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 443
(Mich. App. 1979) (finding duty to inform the client of settlement offer).
41. MODEL RULE 1.2(a).
42. MODEL RULE 1.2 cmt. 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at cmt. 2.
Vol. 3
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factors relating to what person has the authority to set the objectives of the
client and what person or persons the lawyer should contact to fulfill the role
of urging compliance.45
(3) Prohibition Against Assisting in Wrongful Conduct
The rules counterbalance deference to the client's objectives by pro-
hibiting lawyers from knowingly assisting in wrongful or fraudulent activ-
ity.46 Model Rule 1.2(d) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a cli-
ent, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudu-
lent. Although lawyers must not aid a client in circumvent-
ing the law, the rules expressly protect the right of the law-
yer to advise a client regarding whether particular conduct
violates the law. A lawyer may discuss the legal conse-
quences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and
may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the
law.
47
A comment to Rule 1.2 makes the point that, despite the prohibition against
aiding a client in breaking the law, the rules protect the lawyer's right to ex-
plain the law to the client.
Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling
or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohi-
bition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving
an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear
likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact
that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal
or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of
action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an
analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and rec-
ommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be
committed with impunity.
4
Of course, courts rather than lawyers are the ultimate arbiters of the
question whether conduct amounts to assistance in breaking the law. The
comment suggests to courts that they should require specific evidence that a
lawyer knowingly aided a client in an unlawful venture before holding the
45. Model Rule 1.13, considered in subsection (b), discusses the role of corporate counsel
in making these difficult decisions. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at R. 1.13.
46. See MODEL RULE 1.2(d).
47. MODEL RULE 1.2(d).
48. MODEL RULE 1.2 cmt. 9.
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lawyer complicit in violations of the law. Moreover, it urges courts not to
draw an inference of wrongful assistance from the fact that a lawyer pro-
vides information about the law that the client used unlawfully.
When client objectives are contrary to law or the client persists in
conduct that the lawyer finds repugnant, the lawyer may withdraw from the
representation. 49 The rules provide substantial discretion to lawyers in mak-
ing the decision to withdraw from a representation.5" The rules also note that
the problem of assistance is particularly difficult if the lawyer discovers cli-
ent wrongdoing during a representation. "When the client's course of action
has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially
delicate.' In such a case, the rules require that the lawyer withdraw or
withdraw and disaffirm any work product that the client may be using.52
The line between advising the client about the law and assisting in a
crime can be a thin one. Lawyers face a dilemma when the client asks about
the likelihood of prosecution for particular conduct. For example, enforce-
ment of environmental disclosure laws has varied from administration to
administration. When a client asks a lawyer about the likelihood of prosecu-
tion, the truth may be that the likelihood of any enforcement is extremely
low. In the case of environmental reporting, for example, such information
may encourage a client to disregard its obligation to report. It may facilitate
the client's avoidance of complying with the law. Nevertheless, this com-
munication of information appears to fall on the protected side of the line
drawn by Comment 9 to Rule 1.2." The lawyer should note to the client that
fear of enforcement is not the only reason for compliance with the law.
Moreover, other law underscores the lawyer's duty to urge clients to comply
49. See MODEL RULE 1.16.
50. Similarly, the decision of whether to accept a representation is essentially unlimited.See Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 75 (2000).
51. MODEL RULE 1.2 cmt. 10.
52. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally
supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must,
therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In
some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to
give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or
the like. See Rule 4.1. MODEL RULE 1.2 cmt. 10. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof IResponsibility, Formal Op. 93-376 (Aug. 6, 1993) (noting "noisy withdrawal" may not be"entirely effective" in dealing with client fraud likely in pretrial stages of a case); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'i Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (Aug. 8, 1992) (noting thatRule 1.16 requires a lawyer to withdraw from a representation in which a client is using alawyer's services or work product to perpetrate a fraud and further that the Rule permits the
lawyer to disaffirm documents prepared in the representation that will be used to further the
fraud).
53. In one sense, SEC Rule 205 passed pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has the effect
of taking away from the lawyer the benefit of this comment and, thus, making the agency
more like a tribunal in terms of the balance of interests struck in favor of disclosure. See
MODEL RULE 3.3.
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with the law, to refrain from assisting or engaging in unlawful conduct.
Lawyers are subject to state and federal statutes and the common law.
4
Lawyers must comply with state and federal laws and regulations, rules of
civil procedure, and the common law. In other words, lawyers do not get a
"free card"55 to obey or ignore laws based on the status of being a lawyer.
(4) The Duty to Keep the Client Informed
Model Rule 1.4 states another important tenet of the lawyer-client
relationship, requiring that the lawyer keep the client informed about the
representation. Among other things, it declares that the lawyer shall "rea-
sonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objec-
tives are to be accomplished," and "keep the client reasonably informed
about the status of the matter." It states the lawyer's duty to "explain a mat-
ter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." Comment 1 to Rule 1.4 notes the
need for "[r]easonable communication between the lawyer and the client" to
enable the client "effectively to participate in the representation." Comment
5 develops the theme:
The client should have sufficient information to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation and the means by which they are to be pur-
sued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so....
The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill rea-
sonable client expectations for information consistent with
the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's
overall requirements as to the character of representation.5
6
This common sense requirement is essential to achieving the purposes of
hiring a lawyer in the first place. Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.4 notes the
intersection of this rule with the rule on organizational clients. "When the
client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to
inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the law-
yer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the or-
ganization."57
Like other clients, the organizational client must have information
about the law in order to comply with the law while seeking to achieve its
business purposes. Unlike human clients, however, the organizational client
54. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusing to dismiss RICO
claim against lawyers).
55. This use of "free card" is based on the monopoly move of having a "get out of jail
free" card.
56. MODEL RULE 1.4 cmt. 5.
57. MODEL RULE 1.4 cmt. 6.
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may involve multiple decision makers who may have divergent views and
conflicting personal interests. Representation of an organization may span a
variety of projects and goals. These realities of representing organizational
clients as well as the different rules applicable to the organizational setting
can make the role of the lawyer different in the corporate context. The vi-
sion of the Model Rules regarding corporate counsel's role in advising the
client comes into focus in Model Rule 1.13.5"
(5) The Duty of Confidentiality
Confidentiality is one of the core principles of the legal profession."
The principle of confidentiality is expressed both in the rules of legal ethics
and in the law of evidence in the attorney-client privilege. Model Rule 1.6
establishes the lawyer's duty of confidentiality and the ability of the lawyer
to reveal such confidences in limited circumstances.6" An important under-
lying purpose of the duty is to encourage the free flow of information be-
tween clients and their lawyers. 6' The duty extends to existing, former, and
prospective clients, and it has special importance in the corporate setting
because of corporate counsel's extensive knowledge of the business opera-
tions of the client. While confidentiality is undoubtedly one of the most
important duties that lawyers owe clients, it is not an absolute, and lawyers
should not assume that it provides shelter for every decision.62
The 1983 version of Model Rule 1.6 has been the subject of intense
debate.63  The ABA's statement of confidentiality adopts a minority ap-
proach that is out of step with the majority of jurisdictions in the country.'
Nevertheless, the ABA's statement of the principle has continuing impor-
58. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
59. It has been called the "central moral tradition of the profession." Robert P. Lawry,
The Central Moral Tradition ofLawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311 (1990).
60. Legal scholars have criticized the rule and the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility proposal amending the rule. See generally Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 721-
24 (1993).
61. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 6.7, 1-3 at 296-300 (1986);
Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm,
70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1985).
62. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 158 (1986) (holding that the duty of confidential-
ity does not require an attorney to assist a client's fraud or to allow it to go unpunished).
63. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, 109 (2000); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, I THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 1.6:102, at 130.2 (1997 Supp.). See generally Irma Russell, Unreasonable
Risk: Model Rule 1.6, Environmental Hazards, and Positive Law, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
117 (1998).
64. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Be-
fore the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 n.92 (2003) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 cmt. f (2002)) (noting that 37
states permit lawyers to reveal confidential client information in order to prevent the client
from committing criminal fraud).
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tance. This is true even though the ABA has now modified the rule in sig-
nificant ways. Most states will revise their rules in response to the ABA's
comprehensive 2002 revisions of the rules.
65 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that the Model Rules failed to secure the goal of uniformity in the area of the
duty of confidentiality. While nearly all states adopted the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, few accepted the 1983 version of the model
rule as promulgated by the ABA.
66 Most states incorporated significant varia-
tions, moderating the duty in cases of superior interests of others and public
policy. The 1983 version of Model Rule 1.6 states:
Confidentiality of Information:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to repre-
sentation of a client unless the client consents after consulta-
tion, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in
paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish
a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the law-
yer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or
to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.
This statement of the duty of confidentiality sets the scope of the
duty broadly, prohibiting a lawyer from revealing "information relating to
representation of a client.''67 It creates two exceptions, permitting disclosure
of information (1) to prevent the client from committing a crime that is
likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm," and (2) to
protect the lawyer's interests (sometimes referred to as the "self-defense
65. At the time of this Article, North Carolina is the only state that has revised its ethics
rules based on the 2002 Model Rules. E. Fitzgerald Parnell, III, Proposed Revisions to the
Rules of Professional Conduct, available at http://www.ncbar.com/home/proposed-rules.asp
(last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
66. See Russell, supra note 63, at 172.
67. MODEL RULE 1.6(a).
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exception").6" A literal reading of the 1983 rule prohibits disclosure even for
the purpose of preventing a life-threatening act if the act is not a crime. The
Rule does not counsel or require disclosure in any case, even if the disclo-
sure would prevent harm to the general public or large numbers of people. It
provides no avenue for disclosure to avert economic injuries, even if the
injuries are of a magnitude of the Enron disaster. It includes no normative
statement that a lawyer should disclose information in any case. Indeed, a
lawyer who knows of terrorist acts planned by a client would not violate
Model Rule 1.6 by remaining silent. The absolute nature of the 1983 version
of the rule set the stage for legislative reform as well as reform of the rule
itself through the ABA process of amendment.69
The Organizational Client
No understanding of corporate counsel's role under the ABA Model
Rules is possible without exploring Model Rule 1.13, which addresses spe-
cifically the lawyer's duties in the context of representing organizations, in-
cluding corporations.7 ° Indeed, reference to the rules of general applicability
explored above can be misleading when applied to corporate counsel be-
cause the principles relating to advising and keeping the client informed
about the representation are modified significantly in the context of the or-
ganizational client. Accordingly, a lawyer representing a corporation or
other organizational client should consider each of the duties discussed
above in light of Model Rule 1.13.
(1) The Identity of the Client
The rule mandates that the lawyer representing an organizational
client act for the entity rather than for its constituents.7 Determining whom
the lawyer represents is a crucial threshold question of any representation.72
Because an organizational client is not a person, it must act through indi-
viduals. Its existence as a person is a legal fiction in a certain sense. While
the officers, directors, and employees act for the organizational client, they
are not the client. The lawyer representing a corporation owes his allegiance
68. MODEL RULE 1.6(b)(2). See Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 762 n.73 (2001) (pointing out that the term is a misnomer).
69. See Russell, supra note 63, at 117 (noting the categorical operation of Rule 1.6).
70. See MODEL RULE 1.13 cmt. 6 (revised 2002).
71. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. "Group claim" in this context means a
non-divisible claim advanced by a group of individuals, such as a petition to EPA's Office of
Civil Rights seeking denial of a permit or other prospectively protective action.
72. See John M. Burman, Who is the Client, and With Whom Should the Lawyer Inter-act?, 25 Wvo. LAW. 37 (April 2002) (discussing Wyoming cases addressing the issue of
client identity).
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to the corporate entity rather than to the individuals who are constituents of
the corporation. 3
Model Rule 1.13 recognizes that the highest authority in a corporate
client is the board of directors.7
4 Comment 4 to the rule states: "The organi-
zation's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will
be the board of directors or similar governing body."
75 Similarly, Comment
3 to Model Rule 1.13 states: "Review by the chief executive officer or by
the board of directors may be required when the matter is of importance
commensurate with their authority." Thus, the rules identify the board of
directors as the embodiment of the client. This point is consistent with sub-
stantive corporate law.76  The comment specifies immediately following
the preceding statement that, in some circumstances, the board of directors
may delegate responsibility to another body. "[A]pplicable law may pre-
scribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere,
for example, in the independent directors of a corporation."
77 An example of
such a delegation is found in SEC Rule 205, passed pursuant to the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act. It authorizes the board of directors of an issuer to estab-
lish a "qualified legal compliance committee" (QLCC) as the body to re-
ceive information about violations of SEC rules or laws.
7s
(2) Confidentiality and the Organizational Client
In representing a corporate client, the lawyer will often obtain in-
formation from officers, directors, employees, and constituents of the client.
Generally, information imparted to the lawyer is subject to the duty of confi-
dentiality and the attorney-client privilege. Close working relationships that
extend over years or intense and important projects can create a feeling in
both corporate employees and lawyers that the lawyer protects their inter-
ests. Frequent repetition of the fact that the lawyer represents the corpora-
tion rather than individuals is necessary. This important basic principle can
73. See MODEL RULE 1.13(a) (derived from EC 5-18 of the Model Code); Waggoner v.
Snow, Becker, Kroll, Kiaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501, 1505-06 (9th Cir. 1993); Stratton
Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180, 1184-85 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (noting that lawyer's
duty of care runs to the corporate entity rather than to officers or directors). See also George
C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm
to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 597 (1998).
74. MODEL RULE 1.13 cmts. 3,4.
75. MODEL RULE 1.1 3 cmt. 4.
76. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (identifying the plenary power of the board
of directors "except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incor-
poration").
77. MODEL RULE 1.13 cmt. 4.
78. Rule 205 empowers an issuer to establish a "qualified legal compliance committee"
(QLCC) to receive reports of violations of law in the securities context. See 17 C.F.R. Part
205.2(a).
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be hard for the lawyer as well as for the corporate employees who work with
the lawyer.79
(3) Advising the Organizational Client of Violations of Law
Model Rule 1.13(b) guides the lawyer who learns that someone
within the organization intends to violate a legal obligation. The rule pre-
sents two situations: the first involves self-dealing by a constituent of the
company and the second involves a violation of the law.
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, em-
ployee or other person associated with the organization is
engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal ob-
ligation to the organization, or a violation of law which rea-
sonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely
to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest
of the organization."0
The trigger for action permitted by Model Rule 1.13 requires inter-
pretation. The first of two situations involves self-dealing. An officer, em-
ployee, or other constituent is engaged in, or intends to engage in, a violation
of "a legal obligation to the organization." This part of the rule explains that
the lawyer should counter self-dealing to protect the corporation. The rule
includes no limitation on the trigger for lawyer action. When the lawyer
learns of self-dealing by a constituent, he should act as directed in the rule,
revealing the problem to higher authorities within the corporation. The sec-
ond situation, involves a "violation of law." The rule seems to limit its ap-
plication to significant circumstances by the element that the conduct "is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." This "substantial-
ity" limitation differs from the general duty of advising clients under Model
Rule 1.4, which contains no "substantiality of injury" requirement in the
ordinary case of representation of individual clients.
79. It is a principle that lawyers must take seriously, however, not only as a matter of
doing the right thing as a matter of the ethics rules, but also from a liability standpoint. If the
lawyer remains in the employ of the client after he has evidence of criminal violations, the
lawyer may well be subject to sanctions, both civil and criminal. One consequence of Rule
205 may be to narrow the realm of plausible deniability of lawyers as well as clients when
violations are being scrutinized after charges have been filed. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter,
Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399,
1430 (2000) (considering the vantage point of both society and clients in the choice of disclo-
sure rules); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, A Behavioral Inquiry into the
Lawyers' Responsibilityfor Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993) (noting the tendency
of lawyers to identify with their clients).
80. MODEL RULE 1.13(b).
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Subsection (b) sets forth an up-the-ladder reporting system for ad-
vising in a bureaucracy,81 presumably to minimize disruption within the or-
ganization. Read literally, the rule requires four elements before the lawyer
is authorized to act: (1) The lawyer must "know" that a constituent is violat-
ing. (2) The violation must be related to the representation the lawyer pro-
vides. (3) The violation must be one that might reasonably "be imputed to
the organization." Finally, (4) the violation must be of a type "likely to re-
sult in substantial injury to the organization." Model Rule 1.13 appears to
authorize lawyer discretion to move the issue "up the ladder" only when the
four elements are met. Assuming that the lawyer knows with certainty that a
violation of law may be attributable to the client and, further, that the likeli-
hood of enforcement is essentially zero, the rule seems to require that the
lawyer remain silent. In this setting, the rule appears to withhold authoriza-
tion of the lawyer to report the information about the violation "up the lad-
der." Nevertheless, the language leaves room for another interpretation.
Preferring an interpretation of an agreement or statute that produces legal
undertakings, one should not conclude that Model Rule 1.13 requires silence
by the lawyer in the face of a violation of the law that he believes would not
be discovered. To adopt such an interpretation traps the lawyer in a relation-
ship of conspiracy. It would require that a lawyer fully inform the client
about the law but denies the lawyer the right to fully inform the client of
wrongful acts (violations of law) by constituents except when the four ele-
ments described above are present. Recognizing that compliance with the
law is in the long-term self-interest of the client and, thus, in the terms of the
rule, violating the law is against the long-term self-interest of the client, even
when discovery is unlikely. By this (lawful) reading of the rule, breaking
the law is "likely to result in substantial injury to the organization" even if
the violation is not likely to be discovered or prosecuted in the foreseeable
future.
The rule identifies the general duty of the lawyer to act to protect the
client and sets forth the process the lawyer should go through in determining
what to do in such a circumstance, giving the lawyer significant guidance
and (guided) discretion once the four elements noted above are met. Model
Rule 1.13 details the applicable options for the lawyer in general terms, im-
posing a duty on the lawyer to consider the options in light of the significant
circumstances, including the seriousness of the violation, its consequences,
scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the or-
ganization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies
of the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant consid-
erations. In other words, the lawyer is charged with considering the totality
of the circumstances. Although the rule refers to the "policies of the organi-
zation concerning such matters" this phrase should not be read to accept a
policy that would perpetuate willful blindness. Such an interpretation is
81. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.7.5, at 740 (1986).
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against public policy because it would violate the law, thwarting require-
ments and responsibilities created by law. For example, many environ-
mental laws require that a corporate official certify that information is true,
such as a certification that discharge levels are within the levels established
by a permit issued under the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act. A cor-
porate policy could not prevent a lawyer from advising the board of directors
of a violation of these requirements because such a rule would circumvent
the substantive environmental law at issue.
The specific measures the lawyer may consider include a wide range
of responses. The lawyer may ask for reconsideration of the matter, advise
the client that a separate legal opinion should be sought, or refer the matter
to higher authority in the organization, including the highest authority under
applicable law - typically the board of directors of the corporation. In the
event that the problem is not solved by the recourse to these measures, the
rule permits the lawyer to withdraw from the representation.
If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph
(b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the or-
ganization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accor-
dance with Rule 1.16.82
Although the rule does not mandate withdrawal directly, that step is dictated
by circumstances if the client persists in using the lawyer's services in a way
that violates the law.83
In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due
consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its con-
sequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representa-
tion, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent
motivation of the person involved, the policies of the or-
ganization concerning such matters and any other relevant
considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to
minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of re-
vealing information relating to the representation to persons
outside the organization. Such measures may include
among others:
82. MODEL RULE 1.13(b), (c).
83. Cf. MODEL RULE 1.16(a) (2002) (requiring withdrawal if the "representation will
result in a violation of... law"), with 1.16(b)(2) (permitting withdrawal if the "client persists
in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is
criminal or fraudulent"), and 1.16(b)(3) (permitting withdrawal when the client has used the
lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or a fraud).
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(1) asking for reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the or-
ganization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organiza-
tion, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter,
referral to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law. 4
(4) In Pari Materia: Reading the Rules Together
The reporting requirement of Model Rule 1.13 appears to function
as a contextual limit on the lawyer's duty to keep the client informed of de-
velopments relating to the representation set forth in Model Rule 1.4. While
Model Rule 1.4 requires that the lawyer keep clients informed about matters
relevant to the representation, Rule 1.13 mitigates this duty to fit the per-
ceived needs of the corporate enterprise. Model Rule 1.13 employs an "up
the ladder" reporting approach, requiring that lawyers consult with interme-
diaries before reporting to the highest authority within the client (the board
of directors) on an issue of importance to the client. Model Rule 1.13 thus
treats the organization's constituents as able to act for the client unless some
significant harm to the organization is clear. This approach gives leeway to
the constituent authorized to speak or act for the corporation although the
lawyer may not agree with the judgments that constituent makes.
When constituents of the organization make decisions for it,
the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer
even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions con-
cerning policy and operations, including ones entailing seri-
ous risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. However,
different considerations arise when the lawyer knows that
the organization may be substantially injured by action of a
constituent that is in violation of law. In such a circum-
stance, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to ask
the constituent to reconsider the matter.85
Arguably, the lawyer has an independent right to counsel the client
to comply with the law under Model Rule 1.2. The lawyer's ability to advise
a corporate representative who is not involved in the violation is unclear,
however, because the more specific mandate of Model Rule 1.13 seems to
control the lawyer's conduct when a violation is at issue.
84. MODEL RULE 1.13(b) (2002).
85. MODEL RULE 1.13 cmt. 3.
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The law is evolutionary, always subject to progress and change. Be-
cause of the importance of investor confidence to the overall health of the
economy, Congress has sought to enhance corporate accountability in hopes
of restoring investor confidence in the market. The heightened demand for
corporate accountability resulting from these developments can be seen on
many levels, including the new legislation and regulations relating to corpo-
rate disclosures. The financial industry, business groups, and other organi-
zations have sought to encourage voluntary disclosure of financial informa-
tion material to investor choice. 6 The ABA is currently studying changes in
the Model Rules that would make the rules more compatible with this legis-
lation and the need for accountability in today's economy. 7 The following
section focuses on two recent developments in the law of ethics rules and
positive law that are likely to have significant effects on the role of corporate
counsel: (1) the revisions to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and (2) the newly promulgated requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.8
The 2002 Revision of the ABA Model Rules
The ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, also known as the "Ethics 2000 Commission," studied the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct for four years before presenting its
proposed revisions to the American Bar Association House of Delegates. 9
On February 5, 2002, after debating and amending the proposal, the ABA
House of Delegates passed Report 401, adopting the first comprehensive
86. See Jonathan D. Glater, Price-Waterhouse Taking a Stand, and a Big Risk, available
at http://www.nytimes.corn/2003/01/0I/business/01 AUDI.html?todaysheadlines (Jan. 1,
2003) (noting nation's largest accounting firm took a public stance favoring more thorough,
detailed audits to prevent corporate fraud).
87. The American Bar Association adopted revisions to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in February 2002. In March of 2002, the ABA appointed a task force to consider
amending the Model Rules to enhance the protection of the public against corporate fraud.
The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, chaired by James H. Cheek of Nashville,
Tennessee, issued a preliminary report on July 16, 2002, recommending amendments to
Model Rule 1.6 and others to bring the rules into consistency with the majority rule allowing
disclosure in situations of serious harm to "improve corporate responsibility and enhance
public trust in corporate integrity." See Letter of A.P. Carlton of December 18, 2002 to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Re: File No. S7-45-02,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2003).
88. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 ordered the SEC to promulgate regulations to require
lawyers representing corporations subject to the Act to report evidence of material violations
of securities regulations to authorities within the corporation. In response to the Act, the SEC
has promulgated proposed and final rules on the reporting inside and outside the corporate
entity.
89. Honorable E. Norman Veasey, the chair of the Ethics 2000 Commission, moved the
House to consider adoption of the amendments to the rules as House Report 401.
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revision of the Model Rules in over two decades. Although the Model Rules
have no direct application to any lawyer, they provide a model for state eth-
ics rules. Moreover, they are the articulation of lawyer responsibility by the
largest organization of lawyers in the country,9" and the vast majority of
states use the Model Rules to develop their standards of conduct and adopt
the Model Rules without significant modification for most rules.9 As the
above discussion indicates, the ABA changed Model Rule 1.6, acknowledg-
ing that lawyers may be required by other law to disclose client information
in some cases. Moreover, the ABA has authorized additional study of the
rule in light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.92 The most significant changes in
the Model Rules revisions from the perspective of corporate counsel relate to
the duty of confidentiality.
(1) 2002 Revision to Model Rule 1.6
The 2002 revision to Model Rule 1.6 included significant changes.
It adopted four of six exceptions proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission,
adding two exceptions to the two already appearing in the 1983 version of
the rule. The revision also ameliorated the effects of the absolute nature of
the 1983 rule by simplifying the exception to prevent death or bodily harm.
Revised Model Rule 1.6 provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the rep-
resentation of a client unless the client gives informed con-
sent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by para-
graph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary:
90. The ABA represents over 400,000 member-lawyers in the U.S.
91. North Carolina appears to be the first state to revise its rules of legal ethics based on
the completed revision of the ABA Model Rules. Although the North Carolina bar deter-
mined that it would accept the approach of the Model Rules absent compelling reasons to
change the rule, it departed from the 2002 Model Rules in several significant respects, includ-
ing the rule on confidentiality. See North Carolina Adopts Rule Allowing MJP, Other Recent
Changes to ABA Model Rules, 71 U.S.L.W. 2579, 2580 (Mar. 18, 2003). Additionally, Ten-
nessee considered the ABA Proposed Rules as part of its study of its rules revision process.
92. The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, chaired by James H. Cheek of
Nashville, Tennessee, issued a preliminary report on July 16, 2002, recommending amend-
ments to Model Rule 1.6 and others to bring the rules into consistency with the majority rule
allowing disclosure in situations of serious harm to "improve corporate responsibility and
enhance public trust in corporate integrity." See Letter of A.P. Carlton of December 18, 2002
to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Re: File No. S7-45-
02, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm (last visited Mar.
28, 2003).
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(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm;
(2) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance
with these Rules;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to es-
tablish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding con-
cerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or
(4) to comply with other law or a court order.93
Revised Model Rule 1.6 authorizes permissive disclosure when it is
necessary to prevent "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,"94
to "secure legal advice" about compliance with the Model Rules, and to
comply with "other law or a court order." It retains the exception authoriz-
ing lawyers to disclose client information "to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer." The amendment allowing lawyers to disclose client
information to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm
cured one of the most dramatic problems of Rule 1.6. This provision
changed the rule to allow disclosures in circumstances of peril without re-
quiring a finding by the lawyer that the conduct at issue constitutes a crime.
Because of the importance of protecting individuals, the revised exception
dropped the requirement that the death likely to occur be imminent. The
client's right to privacy and expectation of confidentiality should not protect
a client intending to harm others in significant ways.95 Allowing or encour-
aging lawyers to remain silent in the face of peril to others is against public
policy. Moreover, in some circumstances, silence may amount to fraud or
violation of a statutory duty to disclose. For example, environmental stat-
utes create a duty to disclose information. Securities law and even a com-
mon law duty (such as the duty to warn recognized in the Tarasoff case) can
create a duty to speak.96 Case law indicates that lawyers sometimes appro-
priately disclose client information in self-defense even before a formal ac-
93. MODEL RULE 1.6(b) (2002).
94. MODEL RULE 1.6 (b)(1).
95. This statement takes the clearest case of a right of the lawyer to disclose client infor-
mation to prevent harm by a client. The exception of MODEL RULE 1.6(b)(1) (revised 2002) to
prevent death or substantial bodily injury allows the lawyer to disclose client information to
prevent the harm whether or not the conduct at issue is that of the client.
96. See generally, George D. Reycraft, The Role of Counsel in Corporate Acquisitions
and Takeovers: Conflicts and Communications; Articles and Essays: Conflicts of Interest and
Effective Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 605 (1988).
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tion is filed.97 A new comment to Revised Model Rule 1.6 emphasizes that
lawyers should seek to "persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate
the need for disclosure."98
(2) Exceptions in the Proposed Model Rule 1.6
The Ethics 2000 Commission proposed six exceptions to the broad
prohibition. Like the 1983 rule, all the exceptions were permissive, requir-
ing disclosure of client information in no case. The proposed rule would
have created two additional bases for disclosure, but would have allowed
disclosure only in situations in which a client has no rightful expectation of
confidentiality because in each situation the client is using the lawyer's ser-
vices to further a crime or fraud. Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) to the pro-
posed rule would have allowed a lawyer to reveal client information when
the lawyer reasonably believed necessary:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud
that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance
of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
[and]
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the fi-
nancial interests or property of another that is reasonably
certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services.
Although the ABA House of Delegates rejected these exceptions,
many states currently include exceptions permitting disclosure of client in-
formation in such circumstances.99 Subsection (b)(2), the first of the two
rejected exceptions, would have allowed disclosure necessary to prevent
"substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another." Subsec-
tion (b)(3) would have allowed disclosure to "mitigate or rectify substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another." Although these ex-
ceptions would have expanded the bases for disclosure, they would have
done so only in the rare circumstances of criminal or fraudulent conduct by a
client who is misusing the lawyer's services to further the culpable enter-
prise. The rejection of these proposed changes means that lawyers are for-
97. See, e.g., In re Bryan, 61 P.3d 641 (Kan. 2003) (holding that lawyer need not "wait
until the commencement of an action or proceeding before using information to protect him-
self," but that the lawyer involved in the case disclosed client's "confidential information
beyond what was necessary and allowed"). See id. at 655.
98. MODEL RULE 1.6 cmt. 12 (2002).
99. Additionally, Rule 205, promulgated pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, makes
these exceptions applicable to lawyers practicing before the SEC in stated circumstances.
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bidden to exercise their judgment to decide whether harm to a third party or
the public justifies disclosure of client information - even when the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services to further wrongful and damaging
activity.' Some jurisdictions provide protection for the financial interest of
third parties.' Some include "fraudulent" as well as criminal acts within
the exception for harm, extending greater protection to third parties.0 2
Many allow disclosures to "rectify fraud" when the attorney's services have
been used to further a fraud." 3 These exceptions are incorporated in Rule
205 promulgated pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which is dis-
cussed in Part III of this article.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandated new regulations aimed
at preventing future frauds on shareholders and the public. The Act provides
an example of the public and governmental concern relating to corporate
fraud. In addition to setting new requirements on CEOs and CFOs of corpo-
rations subject to SEC regulation,"° and offering protection to employees of
issuers who provide information about violations of securities laws to the
SEC,0 5 the Act required new regulations of accountants and lawyers. Sec-
100. See Irma S. Russell, Client Confidences and Public Confidence in the Legal Profes-
sion: Observations on the ABA House of Delegates Deliberations on the Duty of Confidenti-
ality, PROF'L LAW. 19 (Spring 2002).
101. See, e.g., ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); CONN. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2002); HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002);
MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1) (2002); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16- 106(c) (2002); N.D.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(d) (2002); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1)
(2002); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2002); Utah RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 20:1.6(b) (2002).
102. See, e.g., ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); HAW. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002);
MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)
(2002); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(d) (2002); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.05(c) (2002); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002); WiS. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 20:1.6(b) (2002).
103. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(2) (2002); HAW. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2002); MD.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2002); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(3)
(2002); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2002); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 156(3)(c) (2002); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2002); N.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4(d)(5) (2002); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(f) (2002); OKLA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2002); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(2)
(2002); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05(c)(8) (2002); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2002); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 20:1.6(c) (2002).
104. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302.
105. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204, § 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1514A), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/wblower/refrnc/107_204_806.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2003).
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tion 307 of the Act requires that lawyers report evidence of material viola-
tions of securities law, fiduciary duty or similar violations "to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive of the company."'' 6 In some circumstances,
the Act mandates that the lawyer also report "to the audit committee of the
board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of direc-
tors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the
issuer, or to the board of directors."' 7
SEC Rule 205
Pursuant to Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC issued
its proposed rule on attorney conduct in November 2002.'08 On January 29,
2003, the SEC finalized part of Rule 205."°9 The discussion of the Proposed
Rule on Implementation of Standards of Professional Responsibility speaks
to the role of lawyers.
Attorneys prepare, or assist in preparing, materials that are
filed with or submitted to the Commission by or on behalf
of issuers. Public investors rely on these materials in mak-
ing their investment decisions. Thus, the Commission, and
the investing public, must be able to rely upon the integrity
of in-house and retained lawyers who represent issuers be-
fore the Commission. Attorneys also play an important and
expanding role in the internal processes and governance of
issuers, ensuring compliance with applicable reporting and
disclosure requirements, including requirements mandated
by the federal securities laws." 0
After considering comments from the ABA, law firms, lawyer in-
surers, law professors, and other interested parties, the SEC adopted a final
rule relating to the up-the-ladder reporting requirement and published a new
proposed rule regarding noisy withdrawal and disclosure outside the corpo-
rate entity."' Final Rule 205 requires lawyers to report within the corporate
106. 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2002).
107. Id.
108. See 71U.S.L.W. 2316 (Nov. 12, 2002).
109. See 68 F.R. 6296-01 (Feb. 6, 2003) (stating effective date is 180 days after its publi-
cation in the Federal Register). See also SEC OKs Narrowed Lawyer Conduct Rules, Delays
Action on 'Noisy Withdrawal'provisions, 71 U.S.L.W. 2471, 2472 (Jan. 28, 2003).
110. S.E.C. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 17 CFR Parts 205, 240, 249, [Release Nos. 33-8186; 34-47282; IC-25920; File
No. S7-45-02] RIN 3235-AI72. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm) (last visited Apr. 5,
2003) (describing the role of lawyers).
111. See S.E.C. Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 17 CFR Part 205.3(d)(2). Comments about the new regulation were generally
supportive of the basic purpose of Rule 205 of restoring investor confidence in the market.
See, e.g., ABA Letter of December 18, 2002 to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
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structure evidence of a material violation of securities law or a breach of
fiduciary duty or other similar serious violation of the law. It applies to law-
yers appearing and practicing before the Commission.' 2
Reading Rule 205 and Model Rule 1.13 Together
While the presumption of regularity may sometimes justify the "up
the ladder" approach, Model Rule 1.13 also provides a basis for a lawyer to
refrain from going to the board of directors when a constituent is violating
the law. Rule 205 changes the "up the ladder" approach of Model Rule 1.13
when the lawyer knows that a material violation of securities law is being
committed."' Although Model Rule 1.4 indicates that lawyers should ad-
dress concerns directly to the client, Model Rule 1.13 modifies this approach
in the corporate setting, preferring to allow the corporate constituent or in-
termediary to decide the issue unless "[c]lear justification exist[s] for seek-
ing review over the head of the constituent normally responsible for it.""' 4
Thus, the board of directors (the client) will not learn of a problem unless the
lawyer pursues the problem through several stages up the ladder. The failure
to bring the problem to the board creates a situation in which management
can persist in fraudulent activity without check, as has been seen in recent
cases. SEC Rule 205 appears to destroy the justification for inaction by a
lawyer who knows of a violation of law in the context of securities law spo-
ken to in the rule.
IV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW
Just as the Model Rules do not "exhaust the moral and ethical con-
siderations,"" 5 they do not exhaust applicable legal requirements. In addi-
tion to being accountable under legal ethics rules, lawyers are subject to
other law, including state and federal statutes and common law."6 Law em-
bodied in statutes and case law is not abrogated by the ethics rules." 7 "The
operation of law external to the law of lawyering, - other law - will some-
times 'force' further exceptions, regardless of what a disciplinary code might
say.""'  For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
Attention Jonathan G. Katz, at 2 (noting ABA's support for the mission of "seeking to restore
a culture of integrity and confidence in our financial markets that will warrant the trust of the
American public") (on file with author).
112. 17 C.F.R. Part 205.2(a).
113. SEC Rule 205, discussed supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text, addresses this
issue directly.
114. MODEL RULE 1.13 cmt. 3 (2002).
115. See MODEL RULES, scope, para. 16.
116. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusing to dismiss on RICO
claim against lawyers).
117. MODEL RULES, scope, para. 5-7.
118. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6:109, at 168.1-.2; see also
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quires lawyers to engage in inquiry concerning a matter asserted in litigation.
Some environmental laws and regulations require any person with knowl-
edge to report a violation to authorities, and lawyers are not generally ex-
empt from law by virtue of their role as lawyers." 9
Model Rule 1.6 acknowledges the superior interests of others in
some circumstances, allowing disclosure to prevent death and to comply
with law. Additionally, Model Rule 3.3 imposes a duty on lawyers not to
mislead a tribunal. It prohibits lawyers from offering evidence "that the
lawyer knows to be false"'"2 and from making a "false statement of material
fact or law to a tribunal."' 2 ' It creates significant duties of disclosure in for-
mal proceedings before a tribunal.'22 Model Rule 3.3 provides the strongest
counterbalance to Model Rule 1.6, expressly noting that the duty of candor
applies "even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6."' 123 The Rule stops short of creating an affirmative
duty on the lawyer to police the conduct of his clients or monitor or certify
statements of the client to a court or to a government agency. Moreover, its
mandate does not appear to reach transactional representations. Thus, law-
yers serving clients in purchases or other matters not proceeding under the
supervision of a court or administrative body seem to be outside the control
of Model Rule 3.3. Rule 205, promulgated as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act appears to give the SEC preference in the same way Model Rule 3.3
creates an obligation of candor to the court. Lawyers subject to Rule 205
cannot seek refuge in the contours of Model Rule 1.13 and, as a result of the
rule, must report to the board of directors or its delegate information about
illegal conduct of employees or constituents when constituents refuse to cor-
rect a violation of law.1
24
George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of Cor-
porate Counsel, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 605 (1988) (noting cases brought against lawyers alleged to
have assisted clients in committing securities law violations); Barbara Glesner-Fines, Looking
Ahead at Lawyer Liability to Non-Clients, 37 So. Tx. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
119. See, e.g., Clean Air Act 113(c)(2), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1994); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-21 - 37 (West 1992). The New Jersey Administrative Code, which
implements the Act, provides that "any person including but not limited to the owner or op-
erator of an underground storage tank system" shall report the release after confirming its
existence to the local health agency. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 14B-7.3(a) (1990) (emphasis
added).
120. MODEL RULE 3.3 (a)(4) (2002).
121. MODEL RULE 3.3 (a)(l).
122. See People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an attor-
ney confronted at trial with knowledge of his client's perjury has a duty to reveal that infor-
mation to the court); Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (2001)
(holding in-house counsel who sued former employer may disclose relevant facts to her law-
yer, including privileged communications and client confidences).
123. MODEL RULE 3.3(b).
124. Directors also have a duty to report illegal conduct to the corporation's board of direc-
tors. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Sec. Litig., 698 A. 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Limitations on the Duty of Confidentiality
Generally, the duty of confidentiality protects a lawyer's silence ex-
cept when a disclosure is necessary to prevent future significant harm. Re-
vised Model Rule 1.6 sets forth exceptions to the duty of confidentiality to
prevent harm and to comply with law." 5 Even without such an acknowl-
edgement in the Rule, the obligation of law applies to lawyers as well as to
others.
26
The Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Counsel
Whether discussions between corporate officials and the lawyer
serving as in-house counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege
depends on a variety of factors. In the course of day-to-day operations of the
company, in-house counsel may be consulted regarding personnel and other
management matters. Comment 35 to Revised Model Rule 1.7 gives guid-
ance to lawyers who serve on boards of corporations or other organizations.
Whether the lawyer's role in these discussions is that of a legal advisor or as
a corporate officer can be difficult to ascertain. 127 An addition to the com-
ment in the 2002 revision cautions lawyers to advise clients and members of
the board of directors "that in some circumstances matters discussed at board
meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of a director might not
be protected by the attorney-client privilege."'28 The comment also notes
that lawyers may need to advise clients that the lawyer should recuse himself
as a director in some circumstances because of conflict of interest considera-
tions. "'
One of the primary vehicles for protecting clients from required dis-
closure of information and documents sought in discovery is the attorney-
client privilege. 3° The privilege applies to evidence acquired or created as a
result of consulting a lawyer for legal advice.' 3 ' All states and the federal
125. MODEL RULE 1.6(b)(1), (4).
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §63, REVISED MODEL
RULE 1.6 (4); see also Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1389 (1992).
127. See, e.g., MODEL RULE 1.13 cmt. 7.
128. MODEL RULE 1.7 cmt. 35.
129. Id.
130. For a full discussion of each element of the privilege and the doctrine, see EDNA
SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE (4th
ed. 2001).
131. The privilege may extend to documents revealed to third parties helping the lawyer
provide legal advice. See Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding
privilege was waived as to documents client provided to accountants not hired to help provide
legal advice).
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government recognize the attorney-client privilege. 32  The privilege bars
introduction of communications between a client and his lawyer and com-
munications to others when the purpose of the communication is to assist the
attorney in rendering advice to the client) 33  The attorney-client privilege
does not protect communications between a lawyer and client that further an
ongoing criminal enterprise, however. 3 4 In cases of danger to another, as
when a client uses the lawyer to further a crime or fraud, the attorney-client
privilege will not protect client information from ultimate disclosure in
court. Thus, clients engaged in ongoing wrongful conduct have no reason-
able expectation that their lawyer will shield the information from discov-
ery. 35 The crime-fraud exception denies protection to communications be-
tween a client and his lawyer when the lawyer's services are used to further
a crime or fraud whether or not the lawyer knew the client was engaged in a
crime or fraud. 36 If a communication is within the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege, the law requires disclosure of the client infor-
mation under legal process. The exception to the duty of confidentiality
permitting disclosure required by law acknowledges such a situation.'37
Thus, a corporate client or lawyer could be required to disclose client infor-
mation relating to a crime or fraud committed by individuals within the cor-
poration. "The attorney-client privilege in every jurisdiction provides that
conversations between clients and lawyers (including communications be-
tween boards of directors and corporate counsel) are not protected by the
132. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.3.1 (1986); see also Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (noting Fed. Rule of Evid. 501 encourages full and frank
disclosures to lawyers).
133. United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1499 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Gerrits v. Bran-
nen Banks of Florida, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 574 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding that attorney-client privi-
lege barred discovery of corporate lawyer's communications with corporation as to merger,
tender offer, and legal advice in shareholder securities fraud action).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing be-
tween attorney-client privilege for past criminal act and crime-fraud exception to privilege
relating to ongoing criminal enterprise); In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(requiring showing of ongoing or imminent crime or fraud for exception to apply); Olson v.
Accessory Controls and Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14 (Conn. 2000) (adopting civil fraud excep-
tion to attorney-client privilege and holding standard is satisfied by showing of probable
cause to believe communication was made with intent to defraud, but finding exception not
shown in case).
135. It is also possible that information, though confidential under Rule 1.6, is not privi-
leged because the client information is not a communication. For example, eyewitness evi-
dence is not excludable and, thus, a prosecutor could justifiably subpoena the lawyer to testify
about the information if the evidence is essential to the case and cannot be obtained other-
wise. See MODEL RULE 3.8(e) (2002). In the context of working inside a corporation, it is
hard to conceive of how corporate counsel might witness a crime or fraud that is not a "com-
munication," but the possibility should be noted.
136. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that lawyer's
ignorance of intended crime does not affect applicability of exception).
137. See Model Rule 1.6(b)(4).
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privilege when the client (or its agents, the board) is using the lawyer to
commit a crime or fraud."'
138
Although lawyers should not make decisions for the client, they
must urge compliance with law and must refrain from aiding a client in
unlawful objectives. The Model Rules note the importance of compliance
and the integral role of the lawyer in urging compliance with the law.
"Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends
primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon
reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon
enforcement through disciplinary proceedings."'139 Both the system of legal
ethics and the larger U.S. system of justice as a whole depend on voluntary
compliance. A comment to Model Rule 1.6 notes the importance of the
lawyer's role in advising clients to comply with the law. "Almost without
exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and
what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and cor-
rect. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the
advice given, and the law is upheld."'' ° While compliance with the law may
mean additional short-term costs, it results in long-term gains if the market
presents a competitive field of law-abiding players rather than short-term
shams, free riders, or fraudfeasors. "Most lawyers thus already do the right
thing when faced with client securities law violations and breaches of fiduci-
ary duty, but a few lawyers do not.""'a' Moreover, assuming that law-
breakers obtain a competitive advantage can have no effect on the obliga-
tions of compliance. The fact that the market includes those willing to break
the law for a competitive advantage cannot serve as a reason to relieve eve-
ryone of the burden of the law.
While the corporate lawyer should not assume lightly that manage-
ment or other intermediaries would refuse to address a problem, the lawyer
should be permitted by rules of ethics to proceed in a manner that would be
deemed reasonable as a matter of tort law. The lawyer who fails to act in
circumstances that would justify a report to the board of directors may face
malpractice charges - whether the representation relates to securities law or
138. Comments of Professor Susan P. Koniak, Boston University School of Law; Roger C.
Cramton, Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell Law School; George M. Cohen, Ed-
ward F. Howrey Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, December 17,
2002 (File name: skoniakl.htm), Comments on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys [Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868; IC-25829; File No.
S7-45-02], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml.
139. See MODEL RULES, pmbi., para. 16.
140. MODEL RULE 1.6 cmt. 2.
141. Comments of Richard W. Painter, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, Ann Arbor, December 18, 2002, on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys [Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868; IC-25829;
File No. S7-45-02], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rwpainterl.htm
(last visited 4/9/2003).
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other areas.'42 Thus, tort law recognizes a duty of care that is not fully in-
corporated into the regulatory scheme of the Model Rules. Like everyone
else, the lawyer cannot escape the obligation imposed by the common law to
avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others.1 43 Like everyone else,
the lawyer should be allowed to protect himself against such liability as well
as protecting investors and the public from the serious harm that can flow
from securities fraud. "No lawyer representing a client before the Commis-
sion should be put in such a situation where the lawyer cannot use a full
range of options, including disclosure and the threat of disclosure, to protect
investors and the lawyer from financial injury at the hands of a client that
has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a fraud."'"4
V. CONCLUSION
If all men were angels we would not need laws, but if all lawyers
were angels, we would still need ethics rules to draw the line between the
lawyer's duties to the individual client and to society. Both law and rules of
ethics define the obligation of lawyers, meaning that lawyers must further
the objectives of the client while urging compliance with the law, while also
modeling compliance with the law. Most lawyers serve their clients and the
public interest, effectively balancing the duties owed to each. 45 This fact
does not obviate the need for professional standards to articulate and define
this balance. Nor does it mean that the legal profession should be free of
regulation. Such a proposition is contrary to the principle of the rule of law
because it elevates a class of individuals beyond the reach of the law. In a
system of justice operating under the rule of law, the norms applicable to
lawyers must constrain conduct that is contrary. to the public good rather
than assuming that all individuals who have achieved the status of lawyers
will balance the needs of clients and society in all cases.
142. See George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Fail-
ure to Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdo-
ing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 597 (1998)
143. See Irma S. Russell, Unreasonable Risk: Model Rule 1.6, Environmental Hazards,
and Positive Law, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 117 (1998).
144. Comments of Richard W. Painter, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, Ann Arbor, December 18, 2002, on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys [Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868; IC-25829;
File No. S7-45-02], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rwpainterl.htm
(last visited 4/9/2003).
145. "The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of
self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are con-
ceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of
the bar." MODEL RULES, pmbl., para. 11.
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